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Abstract
The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has developed a mobile 
laboratory for radiation safety and security applications. During source finding 
and monitoring missions, the laboratory utilises four in-situ gamma spectrometers 
working in 5 s acquisition intervals. The spectra are analysed immediately in 
the field and the results are automatically sent to a remote control centre for 
further processing. In operational spectrum analysis, a low false alarm rate 
is of paramount importance. A robust summation algorithm based on peak 
hypothesis testing was deployed. The algorithm is shown to work well with 
statistics fully under control when the baseline area under a tested peak is 20 
counts or more.  
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KuuKanKorpi Satu, Toivonen Harri, Moring Mikael, SMolander 
petri. Mobiili spektrometrijärjestelmä lähteenetsintään ja tulosten välittömään 
raportointiin. STuK-a224. Helsinki 2007, 42 s + liitteet 8 s.
Avainsanat: mobiili gammaspektrometria, reaaliaikainen automaattianalyysi, 
piikkisignifikanssi, virhehavaintotaajuus, onnettomuuksiin varautuminen, 
lähteenetsintä, säteilyturva
Tiivistelmä
Säteilyturvakeskus (STUK) on kehittänyt mittausauton säteilyturvallisuusso-
velluksia ja säteilyturvatehtäviä varten. Auton laitteistoon kuuluvat neljä in-si-
tu-gammaspektrometriä mittaavat kukin spektrejä viiden sekunnin aikavälein. 
Kaikki spektrit analysoidaan reaaliaikaisesti kentällä ja tulokset lähetetään 
automaattisesti STUKiin mahdollista jatkoprosessointia varten. Olennaisimpia 
vaatimuksia operatiivisiin säteilyvalvontatehtäviin soveltuvalle spektrianalyy-
sille on, että se antaa mahdollisimman vähän vääriä hälytyksiä. Tätä tarkoitusta 
varten kehitettiin ja testattiin yksinkertainen mutta järeä piikkihypoteesitestiin 
perustuva summeerausalgoritmi. Tässä raportissa esitetyt testitulokset osoit-
tavat, että algoritmi toimii luotettavasti ja ennustetun statistiikan mukaisesti, 
kun testattavan piikin taustassa1) on vähintään 20 pulssia.
1) Taustalla tarkoitetaan tässä englanninkielistä termiä baseline, jolle ei ole omaa suomenkielistä 
vastinetta.
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Symbols
a  peak area
a  source activity, bq
b  average baseline per channel
B  baseline area under the peak
B1  number of counts in lower baseline calculation area 
B2  number of counts in upper baseline calculation area
c  ratio of measured to theoretical standard deviation of A
C  total counts in ROI
d ( a)  standard deviation of peak area
d 2 ( a)  variance of peak area
d ( p)  standard deviation of p, see below
f  gamma yield per disintegration
g  ratio of counts in peak calculation area to total counts 
  in a gaussian peak
i( x)  detected count rate at distance x, cps 
kα, kβ  gaussian abscissa determined by the risk level α or β
lC (α)  currie’s decision limit
ld (α)  currie’s detection limit
Mda  minimum detectable activity, bq
n  channels below each baseline calculation area
n  number of measured spectra
p (S)  cumulative gaussian probability distribution
p0  cumulative gaussian probability at S = 0
p  ratio of counts in the upper baseline calculation area to counts 
  in the lower baseline calculation area, B2 / B1
S  peak significance
Soffset  average peak significance for a given ROI without a source
  ( e { Soffset } = 0 )
T  counting time, s
W  channels under the peak calculation area
x  vehicle to source distance
ε  absolute detection efficiency
µ  linear attenuation coefficient, 1 / m
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1 Introduction
The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has developed a mobile 
laboratory called SONNI (Sophisticated on-site nuclear identification) for 
emergency preparedness and Nuclear Security [1]. SONNI is operated by a crew 
of four and is equipped with air sampling and sample measurement systems, 
including in-situ gamma spectrometry systems. SONNI has three different ways 
of communicating with headquarters: commercial gPRS and a TeTRA-based 
Public Authority network called vIRve and satellite. SONNI is capable of fallout 
mapping, source finding and, most importantly, communicating the results to 
the operations centre in real time.
Whilst in the field, SONNI produces a huge amount of data, especially when 
used for source finding. This data must be analysed in real time and possible 
findings must be communicated forward with minimum delay. Since continuous 
manual analysis of spectra arriving every few seconds is simply impossible, 
automation of the measurements, analyses and communication is required. The 
automated analysis must be fast and reliable, i.e. the frequency of false positives 
must be kept under control.
This document describes the summation analysis algorithm used for real-
time gamma-spectrometry in SONNI and the logic in automated messaging. 
Test results and approximate detection distances are given for various gamma-
emitting nuclides.
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2 Detection system
The in-situ gamma spectrometry system of SONNI consists of three NaI(Tl) 
scintillation detectors and one electrically cooled hPge. The NaI(Tl) detectors 
are wrapped in polyurethane to shield them against abrupt temperature changes; 
their temperature is constantly monitored with thermistors. Two of the NaI(Tl) 
detectors are 5 inches by 4 inch and are collimated to face left and right. The 
third, 2 inches by 2 inches NaI(Tl) detector is collimated with a 15° wide view 
straight ahead. The 58.5 mm by 66.5 mm size hPge crystal is mounted on the 
ceiling with no collimation. This configuration of four detectors provides low 
detection limits, reliable identification and instant directional information. 
The NaI(Tl) detectors are controlled with ORTec digibASe multichannel 
analysers mounted directly on the photomultiplier tube bases. The hPge is 
controlled with DSPec Pro from the same manufacturer. All data is collected 
with UniSAMPO [2] software and the spectra are saved in IMS 2.0 [3] format. 
in-situ measurements are carried out by continuously measuring spectra of 
equal acquisition time, typically five seconds, with all four detectors. These 
spectra are analysed, linked with location information and saved to the lINSSI 
[4] database in real time. The analysis results are automatically communicated 
to headquarters. In addition, the alarms are sent to the mobile (TeTRA) phones 
of the key personnel in the operations centre. All data collecting, processing 
and storing is carried out with one linux server (liisa), whereas all automatic 
communication is left to another linux server (lille).
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3 Summation algorithm for real-time  
spectrum analysis
There are a variety of programs capable of advanced spectrum analysis using 
the IMS 2.0 format spectra as input, including UniSAMPO itself. however, these 
are not used in SONNI. A separate script using a simple summation algorithm 
was developed for fast hypothesis testing of the presence of certain nuclides. 
This is justified for two reasons. First, real-time analysis with any advanced 
gamma spectrometric software puts too heavy a load on the computer server in 
fast in-situ measurements when each of the four detectors produces a gamma 
spectrum once every few seconds. Secondly, peak fitting is not a reliable method 
for peak area and significance calculations under the compromised statistics of 
a spectrum with short integration time. A simple summation over predefined 
regions of interest is a far more robust and faster method.
3.1 Analysis parameters
Prior to measurements, the analysis script is initialised with information on the 
summation parameters, nuclides for hypothesis testing, other energy intervals of 
interest and alarm limits. All this information is given in a specific initialisation 
file (Table I).
The minimum required signal that causes an alarm is defined separately 
for each signal type (roi or nuclide) with the sinternal parameter in the area and 
nuclides block. All alarms for a given signal type can be turned off by setting 
sinternal to -1, as is the case with K-40 in Table I. The parameter sexternal is 
used to define the signal level for outgoing automated messages on detection. For 
example, for cs-137 in Table I, information on a signal with 0.8 < significance < 
1 is not to be sent outside SONNI, but the SONNI crew should automatically be 
notified. The generation of automated messages is described in chapter 5.
3.2 The algorithm
The hypothesis test is based on calculating the peak significance for each nuclide 
in the nuclides block. The peak significance, S, is defined as the ratio of peak 
area a to currie’s decision limit [5] lC(α ),
(1)? ? ? ?C
A AS
L k D A??
? ?
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Area
areaId start (keV) end (keV) sInternal (cps) sExternal (cps)
hiEnd 2750 3000 1.2 1.6
Fit
Peak Width 
(FWHM)
Baseline Width 
(FWHM)
Baseline Distance 
(FWHM)
g kα
1.2 0.6 1.2 0.842 4.753
Nuclides
Nuclide Energy (keV) Peak position 
uncertainty 
(keV)
sInternal sExternal c
Am-241 59.54 3 0.8 1 1
Tc-99m 140.5 3 1 1.2 1
Ra-226 186.2 3 0.8 1 1
I-131 316.5 3 0.8 1 1
Ir-192 364.5 3 0.8 1 1
Cs-137 661.7 3 0.8 1 1
Co-60 1173.2 3 0.8 1 1
K-40 1460.8 6 -1 1 1
Table I. Initialisation file for the summation algorithm. The file is divided into three 
blocks. The Area block specifies alarm limits for pulse rates in the given energy intervals. 
The Fit block specifies the summation parameters for significance calculations (see 
Fig. 1), the area correction parameter, g, and the risk level for false positives in terms 
of the Gaussian abscissa, kα. The g parameter is the ratio of counts covered with the 
summation parameters to total counts in a Gaussian peak. The Nuclides block lists all 
energy lines of interest for each nuclide to be tested together with energy uncertainties 
related to the peak location (temperature drifting). Alarm limits for nuclides are based on 
calculated significances and the sInternal and sExternal thresholds are used for signal 
classification in messaging. The last column, c, is used for correcting systematic errors 
in variance calculations (see Chapter 3.2).
where d(a) is the standard deviation of the peak area and kα sets the risk level 
of detecting false positives in terms of the gaussian abscissa. With kα = 4.753 
the result S > 1 is a false positive once in a million measurements with no real 
activity present. The success of the hypothesis test relies on accurate non-biased 
peak area and variance estimation, i.e. there should be no systematic errors in 
the determination of either one of these.
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Fig. 1. Gaussian peak and summation parameters used for hypothesis testing. All 
parameters are given in units of FWHM. The peak area is calculated by subtracting the 
scaled baseline area from the total counts covered by the PeakWidth. If the PeakWidth 
does not span the whole Gaussian peak, the total counts in a peak is gained by 
scaling with the area correction parameter g. The parameters used for NaI(Tl) spectra 
are PeakWidth = 1.2, BaselineWidth = 0.6, BaselineDistance = 1.2 and g  = 0.842. The 
parameters used to analyse HPGe spectra are PeakWidth = 2.5, BaselineWidth = 2.5 
BaselineDistance = 2.5 and g = 1.
The parameters of the summation algorithm are sketched in Fig. 1. All 
calculations are done in channels. The baseline is calculated from both sides of 
the area of interest according to Baselinedistance and BaselineWidth parameters. 
These two values are then added together and scaled with the number of channels 
under the peak (W) and under the baseline (2n) to get the baseline area B:
(2)1 2
2
B BB W bW
n
?? ?
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where B1 and B2 are defined as in Fig. 1 and b is the average baseline per channel. 
however, with NaI(Tl) detectors, the 1333 kev energy peak of co-60 overlaps 
with the 1173 kev baseline calculation area B2. Therefore, the baseline area of 
the 1173 kev co-60 peak is only estimated from the counts in the B1 area:
(3)1
(1 )
2
p BB W bW
n
?? ?
where p = B2 / B1 depends on the shape of the background spectrum. values 
of p are presented in Table II for the helsinki area. The calculation of the 
standard deviation d ( p) from nearly 30,000 spectra shows that p is essentially 
a constant.
The peak area a is
(4)
C BA
g
??
where C is the total counts in ROI and g is the ratio of counts covered with 
peakWidth to total counts in a gaussian peak. The variance of the peak area 
d2(a) is estimated by
(5)? ?2 2
1 1
2
WD A A B
g n
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
except for co-60 in the NaI(Tl) spectra, for which the variance is given by
(6)? ? ? ?2 2
11 1
2
p W
D A A B
g n
?? ?
? ? ?? ?
? ?
equations (5) and (6) provide a means to estimate the variance of the 
peak area; for small peaks, a = 0. Decision making on peak acceptance as a real 
finding depends on the accuracy of this estimation. Therefore, it is important to 
know the relationship between this theoretical variance and the real measured 
variance. The real measured variance is obtained from the peak area estimates 
provided by the hypothesis testing. The comparison was done with data measured 
in the helsinki area at the beginning of August 2005. Table III presents 
the key results.
The first and foremost result is that the ratio (c) between the measured and 
the theoretical standard deviations is essentially close to 1. hence the peak area 
variance is properly estimated using the simple theory presented in this paper. 
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Detector Left NaI Right NaI Front NaI
p 0.6328 0.6489 0.5730
D (p ) 0.0058 0.0076 0.0124
N 27 926 28 245 27 935
Table II. Factor p (see Equation 3), its uncertainties and number of spectra used in 
calculating the baseline and its calculated standard deviation for Co-60 in the Helsinki 
area (see text).
Since all measurement errors due to hardware failures and software 
malfunction were excluded from the data and the variance is calculated correctly 
enough, there should not be any false positives among the data for a risk level of 
10-6 (kα = 4.753); i.e. the maximum detected significance, Max, should, on average, 
not exceed 1 more often than once in 1,000,000 measurements without a real 
source. Furthermore, the average detected significance, avg, should be close to 0 
when there is no real activity present. Still, there are a total of 9 false positives 
detected with the two big NaI(Tl) detectors with Tc-99m and co-60, plus the 
average detected significance is around 0.2 for Tc-99m for all NaI(Tl) detectors. 
Since the variance is calculated correctly (c ≈ 1) for these nuclides, these errors are 
explained with systematic errors in peak area calculation caused by poor energy 
resolution and spectrum shape, as described in chapter 3.3.2. The presence of 
any real activity may also cause the average peak significance to deviate from 
zero. This is the case with cs-137. The chernobyl fallout is detected with hPge 
(avg = 0.11). The amount of cs-137 in the field was small enough to be masked 
by a naturally occurring bi-214 609.3 kev line in the large NaI(Tl) detectors due 
to the poor energy resolution.
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A neat way to exclude the bias in the peak area is to define a new parameter, 
Soffset:
(7)offset
AvgS
c
?
where c ≈ 1 for all cases other than Am-241 and the front NaI(Tl) detector. The 
Soffset describes the deviation of the significance from zero due to a biased peak 
area. Furthermore, it can be used to adjust the decision limit when locating 
sources in fallout areas. The equation (1) takes the form:
(8)? ? offset
AS S
k cD A?
? ?
The theoretical cumulative probability of false positives as a function of 
the peak significance threshold with risk level α can be calculated for a gaussian 
distribution with a mean value of 0.5 using the error function erf*:
(9)
2
0
1 ( ) 1 1( )
2 2
tresholdS
ttreshold
treshold
erf SP S S e dt
?
??? ? ? ? ?
where
(10)
2
k St ??
The measured complementary cumulative probability distribution is calculated 
from the real data as:
(11)
( )( ) tresholdtreshold
N S SP S S
N
?? ?
where N is the total number of measurements and n (S > Streshold) is the number of 
cases where the measured significance is greater than the assumed significance 
threshold. The theoretical cumulative probability distribution is plotted together 
with the measured cumulative probability distribution for all tested nuclides in 
Figures 2 – 8. As can be seen, the curves for the left and right NaI(Tl) detectors 
follow the theoretical curve quite nicely, whereas the hPge and front NaI(Tl) 
detector curves notably deviate as the energy of the tested gamma line increases. 
This behaviour is discussed in chapter 3.3.3.
*Matlab©
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Fig. 2. Cumulative probability of false positives as a function of peak significance 
threshold for Am-241 with Soffset taken into account and correction c = 0.9 for front 
NaI(Tl). N is the total number of analysed spectra, P0 is the cumulative probability of 
false positives at threshold S = 0 and Max is the maximum detected significance. 
 
Fig. 3. Cumulative probability of false positives for Tc-99m with Soffset taken into account. 
For symbols, see Fig. 2.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative probability of false positives for Ra-226 with Soffset taken into account. 
For symbols, see Fig. 2.
 
Fig. 5. Cumulative probability of false positives for Ir-192 with Soffset taken into account. 
For symbols, see Fig. 2.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative probability of false positives for I-131 with Soffset taken into account. 
For symbols, see Fig. 2.
Fig. 7. Cumulative probability of false positives for Cs-137 with Soffset taken into account. 
For symbols, see Fig. 2
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Fig. 8. Cumulative probability of false positives for Co-60 with Soffset taken into account. 
For symbols, see Fig. 2.
3.3 Sources of error
There are three main reasons for erroneous analysis results: hardware and 
software failures during measurements and systematic errors in peak area 
calculation. In addition, false negatives occur when count rates fall very low.
3.3.1 Errors in measurements
The quality of the measurements is only as good as the quality of the data 
acquisition electronics and software. Any disturbance in either of these may 
have an influence on the analysis results.
The main reason for false positives with the in-situ hPge detector is its 
sensitivity to vibrations. In short, bumps in the road cause variable microphonic 
disturbances in the spectra. Figure 9 shows this effect at its worst, extending 
up to 1660 kev. The effect can be reduced with appropriate fastenings between 
the detector and the ceiling, but when it does occur it is possible that one of the 
spikes coincides with the peak or baseline area of a tested nuclide and gives a 
false positive or a false negative finding.
The NaI(Tl)-part of the system has its own problem: around once in 
10,000 spectra one of the 1024 channels gets a huge number of counts (Fig. 10). 
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Fig. 9. Worst-case microphonics in HPGe.
 
The following spectrum has negative counts in the same channel, cancelling 
the previous spike (Fig. 11). In fact, if the two spectra are added together, 
no irregularities can be seen. The impact on false positives or negatives in a 
single measurement is nevertheless irritating, as is the case with hPge and 
microphonics. This failure is caused by a disturbance in the data collection. each 
spectrum slice is saved as the difference between the total measured counts since 
the beginning of a mission and the total measured spectrum 5 seconds earlier. The 
spike occurs when the software fails in the subtraction for one channel due to a 
communication break with the hardware and assigns all the counts recorded so 
far to that very channel. The negative counts follow in the next spectrum as the 
spike is subtracted from the next, normal spectrum. The error is under repair.
Under heavy load the linux server may slow down so badly that the data 
acquisition and database input form a bottleneck. If either one cannot be done 
in the 5-second time frame, the continuously acquired pulses are distributed 
unevenly between the 5-second spectra and form stripes in waterfall plots, as 
can be seen in Figure 12. A virtual 10-second spectrum gets divided in two so 
that the first spectrum gets 60 – 90% of the total pulses and the second the rest 
of them. Still, both of the spectra get recorded with 5-second integration time. 
In the worst case, the division of pulses starts in the middle of the spectrum. 
Figures 10 and 11 are an example of this uneven pulse distribution starting from 
the spiked channel. These stripes can cause both false total count rates and false 
nuclide identification alarms.
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Fig. 10. Spike in Tc-99m peak calculation area detected with NaI(Tl). All channels after 
the spike have received some pulses from the following spectrum (see Fig. 11 as well). 
 
Fig. 11. Negative spike and lacking pulses after channel no 49 in the following spectra.
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Fig. 12. Stripes as seen in a waterfall plot. Each horizontal pixel line represents one 
spectrum. 1) Location of spectra in Fig. 10 and 11. 2) A real signal from a Tc-99m source.
 
Fig. 13. Erroneous baseline estimation for Tc-99m in a background spectrum. 
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3.3.2 Errors in analysis
limited energy resolution and temperature changes cause errors in peak area 
estimation, especially with NaI(Tl) detectors. Apart from Tc-99m, the deviations 
from zero of the average peak area in Table III are caused by naturally occurring 
isotopes with energy lines overlapping the peak and baseline calculation areas. 
For example, the Pb-214 351.9 kev line intrudes on the I-131 peak and Ir-192 
baseline calculation areas, leaving the average significance for I-131 364.5 kev 
line positive and the Ir-192 316.5 kev line negative. Although these deviations 
can be handled in a known background by substituting the average significance 
in equation (8), this may still cause a few false positives or negatives if the 
background or detector temperature changes drastically.
The case with Tc-99m is slightly different: the algorithm assumes a linear 
baseline, which does not hold for the summation area of the 140.5 kev line in the 
NaI(Tl) spectra. This is due to the slope around 120 kev. The peak and baseline 
calculation areas for Tc-99m are highlighted in a normal 80-minute background 
spectrum in Fig. 13. Since the baseline estimate falls below the real baseline, 
the calculated peak area is positive even if there is no peak. The overestimation 
of the peak area leads to more false positives than decision limit S > 1 with a 
kα = 4.753 risk would indicate. however, this is taken care of by adding Soffset to 
alarm limits.
3.3.3 Low background
The equations presented in chapter 3.2. only work as predicted under gaussian 
statistics, id est, with an average baseline area of at least around 20 counts. As 
can be clearly seen from Figures 2 – 8, the false positives cumulative probability 
curves for the hPge and the smaller (front) NaI(Tl) detector fall far below the 
theoretical curve. Table III shows that for hPge, only Tc-99m has a sufficient 
average baseline. The smaller NaI(Tl) has a large enough average baseline for 
Tc-99m, Ra-226, Ir-192 and I-131. 
As the cumulative probability curves show, applying equations (1) – (8) for 
too low count rates does not give any extra false positives. Instead, the approach 
leads to false negatives. From equations (5) and (1) for S ≥ 1 we get 
(12)
2 4 2 2
2
4* 1
2
2
Wk k Bk g
nA
g
? ? ?
? ?? ? ?? ?? ??
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equation (12) is far too conservative leading to false negatives as shown by 
the following simple calculus. let us estimate a using hPge detector under low 
background conditions, i.e., B = 1 which is typical of some regions for cs-137. Then, 
because kα = 4.753, W/2n = 0.5 and g = 1, a ≥ 24 counts. This is a huge signal. The 
overestimation implemented in equation (12) is based on the conservative form 
of equations (5) and (6); theoretically, the variance calculus should not contain 
the peak area a itself; for small signals this is expected to be near zero. Setting 
a = 0 in equation (5) we get
(13)
(1 )
2
Wk B
nA
g
? ?
?
Now we have a more realistic detection limit: a ≥ 6 counts for the example above.
The low background statistics are a difficult domain of detection limit 
calculus. On the one hand, we do not want to have false alarms, on the other hand, 
we need good detection capability also at low count rates. Adoption of Poissonian 
statistics provides some advantages but also rules need to be developed on 
choosing the methods for certain conditions.
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Table IV. Net count rate per GBq as a function of distance between source and origo. 
Note that the SONNI was placed so that HPGe was fixed at the origo and the distance 
is defined as distance from origo. Therefore, the distance between left and right NaI(Tl) 
detectors and the source is always 70 cm shorter than the tabulated values. Similarly, 
the distance between the front NaI(Tl) and the source is 2.5m shorter. The uncertainty 
estimates are dominated by the uncertainty of the source activities.
Am-241 cps/GBq for 59.54 keV line 
Distance (m) Left NaI(Tl) Right NaI(Tl) Front NaI(Tl) HPGe
20 85.5 ± 5% 88.0 ± 5% 20.5 ± 5% 20.1 ± 5%
40 15.1 ± 5% 14.9 ± 5% 4.43 ± 5% 3.76 ± 5%
80 1.73 ± 5% 1.80 ± 5% 0.534 ± 5% 0.353 ± 6%
120 0.310 ± 6% 0.348 ± 5% 0.0913 ± 6% 0.0520 ± 13%
Tc-99m cps/GBq for 140.5 keV line
Distance (m) Left NaI(Tl) Right NaI(Tl) Front NaI(Tl) HPGe
20 1000 ± 5% 1110 ± 5% 115 ± 5% 187 ± 5%
40 182 ± 5% 199 ± 5% 30.7 ± 5% 37.4 ± 5%
80 21.0 ± 6% 22.0 ± 6% 4.18 ± 7% 3.79 ± 6%
120 6.16 ± 9% no data no data 0.833 ± 11%
Cs-137 cps/GBq for 661.7 keV line
Distance (m) Left NaI(Tl) Right NaI(Tl) Front NaI(Tl) HPGe
20 822 ± 4% 834 ± 4% 41.9 ± 4% 94.2 ± 4%
40 174 ± 4% 177 ± 4% 14.6 ± 4% 21.4 ± 4%
80 30.6 ± 4% 31.4 ± 4% 2.85 ± 4% 3.58 ± 4%
120 9.88 ± 4% 9.58 ± 4% no data 1.10 ± 4%
Co-60 cps/GBq for 1173.2 keV line (NaITl) and for 1332.5 keV line (HPGe)
Distance (m) Left NaI(Tl) Right NaI(Tl) Front NaI(Tl) HPGe
20 630 ± 5% 640 ± 5% 19.5 ± 6% 56.7 ± 5%
40 138 ± 5% 141 ± 5% 6.59 ± 6% 13.2 ± 5%
80 24.9 ± 5% 27.0 ± 5% 1.58 ± 8% 2.39 ± 6%
160 3.77 ± 7% 3.55 ± 7% 0.196 ± 29% 0.320 ± 9%
4 Detection Limits
4.1 Am-241, Tc-99m, Cs-137 and Co-60
Net peak count rates per gbq for each in-situ detector were measured at 
vesivehmaa airfield in May 2005 using four different nuclides and distances. 
The results are presented in Table Iv. 
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Table V. Values for linear attenuation coefficient µ in dry air as a function of gamma 
line energy. Calculated from data given in reference [7].
Gamma line energy (keV) Nuclide m (1/m)
59.54 Am-241 0.0242
140.5 Tc-99m 0.0175
186.2 Ra-226 0.0163
316.5 Ir-192 0.0135
364.5 I-131 0.0128
468.1 Ir-192 0.0116
661.7 Cs-137 0.0100
1173.2 Co-60 0.0076
1332.5 Co-60 0.0071
1460.8 K-40 0.0068
2614.5 Tl-208 0.0051
gamma rays are absorbed in air as the detector source distance increases. 
The count rate per gbq at distance x is related to the count rate i0 at distance x0 [6].
(14)
0( )2
0 0
2( )
x xI x eI x
x
?? ?
?
where µ is the linear attenuation coefficient in air for a given gamma ray 
energy. Some relevant values of µ in dry air at sea level are presented in 
Table v. Data from Table Iv is presented in Figures 14 – 17 together with the 
theoretical attenuation curves from equation (14) for each detector type. The 
curve is normalised to pass the data points at x = 40m. The source was placed 
perpendicularly to the detector for all measurements. Apart from Am-241, the 
results from left and right NaI(Tl) sit nicely on the theoretical curve. The front 
detector is more ambiguous. The deviation with Am-241 could be explained by an 
alteration in weather conditions: the measurements at 20 and 40 m were done 
in dense rain and the measurements at 80 and 120 m in clear weather.
A simple approach to evaluating the minimum detectable activity (Mda) 
as a function of distance between the source and the detector is to consider only 
the statistical fluctuations.
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Fig. 15. Decay-corrected count rates of  Tc-99m at different distances.
 
Fig. 14. Count rates of Am-241 at different distances. Alternating weather.
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Fig. 17. Count ratess of Co-60 at different distances.
Fig. 16. Count rates of Cs-137 at different distances. Cs-137 from Chernobyl fallout is 
eliminated.
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currie’s detection limit is defined as [5]
(15)
22
2
41 1
2
C
D C C
k LL L L
k k
?
? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
where kβ defines the risk level for false negatives. The equation (15) is commonly 
simplified to
(16)2 2D CL k L? ?
where an equal risk is taken for both type 1 (false positive) and type 2 (false 
negative) errors, i.e. k = kα = kβ . A very common choice for both risk levels is 
5%. however, this is not a suitable setting for false positives in these kinds of 
security applications due to the large number of false alerts that seriously disturb 
an operational survey. hence the low type 1 error risk was chosen, in terms of 
gaussian abscissa, kα = 4.753. The type 2 error risk can be essentially higher as it 
only has impact on Minimum Detectable Activity (Mda). Therefore, the common 
choice of 5 % risk level is made for false negatives, i.e. kβ = 1.645.
equation (15) can be simplified through a series expansion:
(17)? ? 1
2D C
k k
L k k L
k
? ?
? ?
?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
equation (17) is a good approximation for equation (15). The difference 
is less than 2% for lC > 20 and it approaches the correct value at larger 
lC values.
currie’s theory is based on gaussian approximation, which is not valid at 
low counts. For lC > 20 counts, equation (17) can be further simplified to
(18)1D C
k
L L
k
?
?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
which gives ld = 1.35*lC. This means that peak significance S = 1.35 refers to 
Mda in calibration measurements performed with SONNI.
Since the detected peak area a is related to source activity a through
(19)A f Ta??
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where ƒ is the radiation yield per disintegration, ε is the absolute detection 
efficiency and T the counting time, equation (8) can be written in the form
(20)? ?offset C
f TaS S
cL
?
?
? ?
On the other hand, we have stated that for minimum detectable activity Mda
(21)? ?1.35 C
f TMDA
cL
?
?
?
hence, for a known activity a0 and a measured significance S0 we get
(22)? ?
0
0
offset
C
S Sf T c
L a
?
?
?
?
and by substituting equation (19) with equation (22) we get
(23)0
0
1.35
offset
aMDA
S S
?
?
Table vI presents the maximum detected significances for right NaI(Tl) 
and hPge detectors from sweeps past the radiation sources at vesivehmaa 
airfield. each source was placed at 20, 40 and 80 (cobalt also at 160) meters from 
origo located in the middle of an airfield taxiway (see Fig. 18). The spectra were 
recorded during the drive from one end of the taxiway to the other at speeds of 
30 km / h and 60 km / h. All detectors were operated in the 5-second mode.
The significances, activities and significance offsets given in Table vI were 
used to calculate the Mda for the 30 km / h speed with equation (23). For static 
measurements, the same original data used to calculate the cps / gbq presented 
in Table Iv was deployed. Mda values for right NaI(Tl) are presented in Figures 
19 – 22. The Mda estimate for hPge is given for comparison, but the results 
for 30 km / h must be treated with great care due to the low count rate issues 
in 5-second measurements explained in chapter 3.3.3. Only the uncertainty 
of the source activity and the measured peak area is taken into account in the 
total uncertainty estimate. The distribution of counts between consecutive 
measurements has a significant effect on the Mdas for moving survey. If the car 
hits the origo in the middle of a measurement, a far greater signal is received 
than if the car hits the origo between two measurements. No effort was made to 
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Table VI. Maximum significances measured at Vesivehmaa airfield as a function of 
source to origo distance.
Am-241 
Right NaI  (Soffset = 0.024)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 59.54 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 42.2 16.847 12.810
40 42.2 8.276 6.447
80 42.2 2.524 2.264
HPGe (Soffset = 0.042)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 59.54 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 42.2 4.453 3.584
40 42.2 1.999 1.927
80 42.2 0.679 0.344
Tc-99m
Right NaI (Soffset = 0.255)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 140.5 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.34 9.467 6.617
40 1.28 3.939 3.259
80 1.17 1.063 0.752
HPGe (Soffset = 0.044)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 140.5 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.34 5.085 3.161
40 1.28 2.386 1.818
80 1.17 0.684 0.480
Cs-137 
Right NaI (Soffset = 1.114)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 661.7 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 3.18 15.110 12.216
40 3.18 7.433 7.086
80 3.18 3.754 3.152
HPGe (Soffset = 0.616)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 661.7 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 3.18 5.653 5.034
40 3.18 3.381 2.867
80 3.18 1.677 1.466
Co-60
Right NaI (Soffset = 0.160)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 1173 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.78 8.261 6.076
40 1.78 4.272 3.134
80 1.78 2.025 1.618
160 1.78 0.661 0.640
HPGe (Soffset = 0.006)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 1173 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.78 3.514 3.273
40 1.78 2.333 1.907
80 1.78 1.090 0.893
160 1.78 0.726 0.467
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Table VI. Maximum significances measured at Vesivehmaa airfield as a function of 
source to origo distance.
Am-241 
Right NaI  (Soffset = 0.024)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 59.54 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 42.2 16.847 12.810
40 42.2 8.276 6.447
80 42.2 2.524 2.264
HPGe (Soffset = 0.042)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 59.54 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 42.2 4.453 3.584
40 42.2 1.999 1.927
80 42.2 0.679 0.344
Tc-99m
Right NaI (Soffset = 0.255)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 140.5 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.34 9.467 6.617
40 1.28 3.939 3.259
80 1.17 1.063 0.752
HPGe (Soffset = 0.044)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 140.5 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.34 5.085 3.161
40 1.28 2.386 1.818
80 1.17 0.684 0.480
Cs-137 
Right NaI (Soffset = 1.114)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 661.7 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 3.18 15.110 12.216
40 3.18 7.433 7.086
80 3.18 3.754 3.152
HPGe (Soffset = 0.616)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 661.7 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 3.18 5.653 5.034
40 3.18 3.381 2.867
80 3.18 1.677 1.466
Co-60
Right NaI (Soffset = 0.160)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 1173 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.78 8.261 6.076
40 1.78 4.272 3.134
80 1.78 2.025 1.618
160 1.78 0.661 0.640
HPGe (Soffset = 0.006)
Distance (m) Source activity (GBq) Detected maximum significance for 1173 keV line
30 km / h 60 km / h
20 1.78 3.514 3.273
40 1.78 2.333 1.907
80 1.78 1.090 0.893
160 1.78 0.726 0.467
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 Fig. 18. Test setup for determining the detection distances in a 5-second operating 
mode at the airfield.
Table VII. Detection distances for HASS activity level of Co-60.
Driving speed 30 km / h , 5 seconds acquisition time
Nuclide HASS activity Detection distance, source to origo (m)
(GBq) Right NaI HPGe
Co-60 4 120 90
Immobile measurement, 500 seconds acquisition time
Nuclide HASS activity Detection distance, source to origo (m) *)
(GBq) Left NaI Right NaI HPGe Front NaI
Co-60 4 260 260 250 155
*) Crude extrapolation.
synchronise the measurements with the passing of the origo since no such thing 
is possible in a real situation.
Detection distances for open co-60 source that exceed the activity level of 
high-activity sealed radioactive sources (hASS) listed in the council Directive 
2003 / 122 / eURATOM [8] are given in Table vII.
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Fig. 19. MDA for Am-241 with 30 km / h driving speed and 5-second acquisition time as 
a function of distance between source and origo compared to results with car parked 
and 500-second acquisition time. Measurements with S < 1 are marked with square 
brackets ([ ]). 
 
Fig. 20. MDA for Tc-99m with 30 km / h driving speed and 5-second acquisition time as 
a function of distance between source and origo compared to results with car parked 
and 500-second acquisition time. Measurements with S < 1 are marked with square 
brackets ([ ]). 
 
36
STUK-A224
Fig. 22. MDA for Co-60 with 30 km / h driving speed and 5-second acquisition time as 
a function of distance between source and origo compared to results with car parked 
and 500-second acquisition time. Measurements with S < 1 are marked with square 
brackets ([ ]).
 
Fig. 21. MDA for Cs-137 with 30 km / h driving speed and 5-second acquisition time as 
a function of distance between source and origo compared to results with car parked 
and 500-second acquisition time.
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Table VIII. Net count rate per GBq as a function of distance between source and origo 
for Ir-192 316.5 and 468.1 keV lines. For NaI(Tl) detectors, the 316.5keV peak incorporates 
the 308.5 and 295.96 keV Ir-192 peaks as well. Similarly, the 484.6 keV peak is included 
in the 468.1keV peak.
Ir-192 cps/GBq for 316.5 keV line  
Distance (m) Left NaI(Tl) HPGe
20 549.839 ± 22% 73.3 ± 22%
40 151.698 ± 22% 14.5 ± 22%
60 42.33409 ± 22% 4.34 ± 22%
70 22.83164 ± 22% 2.21 ± 22%
80 17.30558 ± 22% 1.63 ± 23%
100 6.283168 ± 22% 0.572 ± 22%
120 1.952477 ± 23% 0.193 ± 23%
140 2.000407 ± 23% 0.111 ± 23%
180 0.436766 ± 32% 0.0420 ± 25%
Ir-192 cps/GBq for 468.1 keV line
Distance (m) Left NaI(Tl) HPGe
20 346 ± 22% 49.0 ± 22%
40 89.0 ± 22% 9.72 ± 22%
60 27.8 ± 22% 3.03 ± 22%
70 16.0 ± 22% 1.72 ± 22%
80 11.5 ± 23% 1.30 ± 22%
100 5.02 ± 22% 0.492 ± 22%
120 1.98 ± 22% 0.194 ± 23%
140 1.12 ± 23% 0.105 ± 23%
180 0.558 ± 25% 0.0522 ± 24%
4.2 Ir-192
Measurements for determining the net peak count rate per gbq for Iridium-192 
were repeated with the left NaI(Tl) and hPge detectors at vesivehmaa airfield. 
The error estimates are dominated by the uncertainty of the source activity, which 
was approximately 20% due to a non-existent calibration certificate, therefore 
lacking details of the geometrics of the source. The Ir-192 source was partially 
shielded during the measurements. hence the results presented in Table vIII 
should not be applied together with the results given in Table Iv for efficiency 
calculations.
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Fig. 23. MDA for Ir-192 with 30 km / h driving speed and 5-second acquisition time as 
a function of distance between source and origo compared to results with car parked 
and 500-second acquisition time. Measurements with S < 1 are marked with square 
brackets ([ ]). The 468.1 keV line was used for the calculations.
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5 Automated SDS messages
An SDS (Short Data Service) message is a text message that can be sent via the 
TeTRA-based Public Authorities Network called vIRve in Finland. An SDS 
message may contain up to 140 characters. The transmission of SDS messages 
from SONNI to headquarters is fully automated. The hypothesis test result 
(peak significance above a certain threshold) is the triggering signal for SDS 
transmission.
When the alarm limit defined in the initialisation file is exceeded, the 
analysis script produces an alarm. These alarms are sent to the communications 
database in lille (described in Appendix 1). each alarm is saved as one entry in 
the alarms table containing information about the alarm type (e.g. the detected 
nuclide), alarmed detector, significance, net count rate, position information 
and signal level. If nothing is detected, a specific null-alarm is updated in 
the alarms table. This entry specifies the latest measurement with normal 
background.
The criteria for sending the messages to a certain recipient are stored in 
the communications database, which also contains information on the name, 
address and transmission method. each recipient of automated messages is 
associated with limits for signal level, the number of times the signal level has 
to be exceeded and the minimum configuration of alarmed detectors. A specific 
perlscript called messaging compares the data in the alarms table with the limits 
in the recipients table.
The messaging script is executed once every two seconds. First it checks 
the flags table to see if the detectors are being calibrated or if the system is being 
tested. No messages are sent during calibration, whereas the word “TeST” is 
added to the SDS messages during testing. The test and calibration flags can be 
set from the command line when necessary. If there are no calibrations ongoing, 
the script fetches the maximum significance level for all the alarms generated 
after the latest null-alarm. The next stage is to fetch the limits for sending 
messages for each active recipient and start comparing the limits to the alarms. 
The first criterion to compare is the number of generated alarms that have a 
significance level bigger than the limit stored in the recipients table.  If the limit 
is exceeded, the script compares the configuration of alarmed detectors to the 
needed minimum configuration. There are three different options: any of the 
detectors, hPge and one of the NaI(Tl) detectors, or all detectors. Demanding 
simultaneous identification from hPge and one of the NaI(Tl) detectors is an 
efficient method for excluding false positives caused by microphonics in hPge 
or wrong identifications in NaI(Tl) because of the poor resolution. The last thing 
before writing a message is to check whether there already is a message on the 
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same observation written in the messages table for the same recipient. If true, 
the message is not sent unless the time gap between the existing and the new 
message exceeds the time limit specified in the recipients table.
An example of an SDS message is presented below.
11:47:54 uTC
15Jun2005
Sonni
Cs-137 ident
24.81609
60.20985
auto
l:S2.3 c66
i:S1.0 c5
id = 14
WgS84
This message indicates that at 11:47:54 uTC on the 15th of June, 2005 
Sonni has found and identified*) Cs-137 at latitude 60.20985 and longitude 
24.81609 and automatically generated this message. The nuclide was detected 
with both the left NaI(Tl) and the in-situ hPge detector. The calculated 
significances and net count rates are 2.3 and 66 for NaI(Tl) and 1.0 and 5 for 
hPge. The message identification number is 14 in the communications database. 
coordinates are given in WgS84.
While the messaging script scans the alarms table, another script for 
sending the SDS messages scans the messages table. every time a new SDS 
message is detected in the database, the SDS sending script sends it to its receiver 
via vIRve and marks the message as sent in the database.
*) A nuclide is only marked identified if it is detected with both hPge and at least one of the 
NaI(Tl) detectors and the criterion S > 1 is met. A weak signal detected with only one of the 
detectors is marked as a possible finding. Any observation with a high significance level should 
be detected with more than just one detector. hence a finding with only one of the detectors is 
marked probable, even if the significance level S > 1 is breached.
41
STUK-A224
6 Discussion
The summation algorithm presented in this paper has been in use during 
several security surveillance missions in Finland. It has proven to be fast 
and reliable in real-time analyses [9][10]. however, some optimisation is still 
needed. The algorithm cannot be used as such with low efficiency detectors or 
in circumstances with a very low background where gaussian statistics do not 
apply. This will be corrected in the near future by applying Poissonian statistics 
to these cases. Another weak point is that the low risk setting for type 1 alarms 
makes it insensitive to very small signals. In 2006, a comparison of in-house 
processing methods used in urban gamma spectrometry, was carried out between 
the Technical University of Denmark (DTU) and STUK [11]. The results showed 
that, in comparison with methods based on area-specific spectrum stripping 
(ASSS) or fitting with spectral components (FSc) used and developed by the 
DTU, the peak significance calculation proved to be more insensitive, although 
with better control of statistics and with easier mathematics applied. clearly, 
the algorithm can be made more powerful by including the measurement history 
in the analysis, as is done in the FSc-based methods.
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Appendix 1 
dAtAbAse for communicAtion purposes in sonni
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This appendix describes the communications database designed for automated 
data communication from SONNI.
The communications database comprises seven tables: recipients, messages, 
errors, messagereference, alarms, flags and flaglog, which are all described on 
the following pages:
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Table A.1. The alarms table structure
alarms
Field Type Key Default/Options
idAlarm int(11) P AI NULL
alarmType varchar(7) NULL/nuclideId/
total/hiEnd
source char(1) I/L/R/F
idMeas int(11) F 0
idAnalysis int(11) F 0
significance double(8,1) NULL
SLevel enum(L/M) NULL
cps double(8) NULL
acqEnd datetime NULL
latitude double(8,5) NULL
longitude double(8,5) NULL
idAlarm Identification number for the alarm. Used to link the generated messages to original alarms 
and measurements with the messageReference table. Alarms with idAlarm numbers 1 
to 4 are so called NULL-alarms, one for each in situ detector. These are updated when 
nothing is detected.
alarmType Type of alarm. Options are: detected nuclide (nuclideId), total pulse rate (total), pulse rate 
at high energies (hiEnd) or NULL for the  NULL-alarms.
source Alarmed detector. Options are I for in situ HPGe and L for left, R for right and F for front 
NaI(Tl) detectors.
idMeas Identification number for the analysed measurement in measurements table in Linssi v1.1 
database
idAnalysis Identification number for the analysis that generated this alarm in analyses table in Linssi 
v1.1 database
significance Significance for detected nuclide.
SLevel Relative intensity for the signal as defined in the initialization file for the analysis. So far 
the options are Low for internal alerts and Medium for external signals.
cps Net count rate for the nuclide peak or total count rate or high energy count rate depending 
on the alarmType.
acqEnd The acquisition end time for the measurement identified by  idMeas.
latitude Latitude for the vehicle at acqEnd.
longitude Longitude for the vehicle at acqEnd.
A.1 Alarms
The analysis script writes key information on observations that exceed the 
decision limit in the alarms table.
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Table A.2. The flags table structure
flags
Field Type Key Default
calibration tinyint(1) 0
test tinyint(1) 0
calibration Set TRUE for ongoing calibrations. If TRUE, no messages are sent.
test Set TRUE for running tests. If TRUE, messages are sent only to those recipients with 
parReportTests = TRUE.
A.2 Flags
The flags table is used to communicate ongoing calibrations or tests to the 
messaging script. The flags are set from the command line.
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Table A.3. The flagLog table structure.
flagLog
Field Type Key Default
flagName varchar(20) NULL
setTime datetime NULL
setTo tinyint(1) NULL
flagName Name of the field in the flags table that got changed
setTime Time the change was made
setTo New state for the flag
A.3 FlagLog
The flaglog table is used to track changes in the state of the flags.
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recipients
Field Type Key Default/Options
idRecipient int(5) P AI NULL
recipientName varchar(40) U NULL
method varchar(10) NOT NULL
address varchar(80) NULL
parReportTests tinyint(1) 0
parMessageSent int(5) 60
parSLevel enum(L/M) M
parTimesOverSLevel int(5) 1
parIdentDetectors enum(single/
both/all)
both
parAddInfo enum(S/cps/both) NULL
inUse tinyint(1) 1
idRecipient Identification number for the recipient.
recipientName Name of the recipient.
method Way of communication. For example, SDS for text messages, sound for notifying the 
SONNI crew.
address Recipient’s address. If method is SDS, this is a VIRVE phone number.
parReportTests If FALSE, this recipient won’t get any messages during tests. If TRUE, messages are sent 
also during tests but the messages begin with line SONNI TEST.
parMessageSent Seconds to wait before repeating a message if the same alarms are repeated.
parSLevel Minimum signal level to be reported. Options are the same in the alarms table.
parTimesOverSLevel Minimum number of consecutive signals with signal level >= parSLevel required for report 
to be sent.
parIdentDetectors Minimum configuration of alarmed detectors required for reporting. Options are: single for 
any of the four detectors, both for HPGe and one of the NaI(Tl) detectors and all for all four 
detectors. Note that if a configuration of several detectors is required, only one detector 
has to exceed the minimum signal level parSLevel parTimesOverSLevel times for reporting. 
parAddInfo This parameter is used to define what additional info will be written in the end of the 
message. Options are: s for significance info, cps for pulse rate info and both for both. 
If the total pulse rate is reported, the significance will be marked as 0.0. The chosen 
information is listed from all alarmed detectors. 
inUse Flag used to temporarily exclude (inUse = FALSE) the recipient from the group of message 
receivers without deleting the recipient information from the database.
Table A.4. The recipients table structure.
A.4 Recipients
The recipients table covers name and address information on the recipients for 
automated messages. All fields starting with par are parameters for controlling 
the messaging script.
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messages
Field Type Key Default
idMessage int(11) P AI NULL
idRecipient int(5) F NOT NULL
recipientName varchar(40) NULL
method varchar(10) NULL
address varchar(80) NULL
sender varchar(40) MUL1 NULL
senderReference varchar(20) MUL1 NULL
creationTime datetime MUL2 0000-00-00 
00:00:00
transmitTime datetime NULL
errors tinyint(1) 0
message longblob NULL
comments varchar(80) NULL
idMessage Identification number for the message.
idRecipient Identification of number of the recipient. Key to the recipients table. If the message is 
generated manually to a recipient not included in the recipients table, the recipientName, 
method and address field are inserted straight to the messages table. Otherwise this 
information is fetched from the recipients table.
recipientName See recipients table.
method See recipients table.
address See recipients table.
sender Creator of this message. May be either a person or a program.
senderReference Reference to the message origin. With automatically created messages the senderReference 
put together with identification number of the recipient of the message, alarm type and 
the confidence level of the signal.
creationTime Message creation date and time.
transmitTime Message transmit date and time. If set to NULL, the message has not been sent.
errors If TRUE there are errors associated to the message or to its transmission.
message The message body.
comments A field for comments.
Table A.5. The messages table structure.
A.5 Messages
The messages table is used to store all the messages that are generated in 
SONNI.
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Table A.6. The messageReference table structure.
messageReference
Field Type Key Default
idMessage int(11) F 0
idAlarm int(11) F 0
idMessage Identification number of the message. Key to the messages table.
idAlarm Identification number for the alarm used to generate the message. Key to the alarms 
table.
A.6 MessageReference
This table is used to link the messages with the alarms that caused the message 
to be written.
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errors
Field Type Key Default
idError int(11) P AI NULL
idMessage int(11) F NULL
errorTime datetime NULL
errorText text NULL
idError Identification number for the error.
idMessage Identification number for the erraneous message, Key to the messages table.
errorTime Time of the error.
errorText Description of the error.
Table A.7. The errors table structure.
A.7 Errors
This table is used for storing any errors that might occur when sending the 
messages.
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